The disclosure of the VW emission manipulation scandal caused a quasi-experimental market shock to the observable environmental quality of VW diesel vehicles. To investigate the market reaction to this shock, we collect data from a used-car online advertisement platform. We find that the supply of used VW diesel vehicles increases after the VW emission scandal. The positive supply side effects increase with the probability of manipulation. Furthermore, we find negative impacts on the asking prices of used cars subject to a high probability of manipulation. We rationalize these findings with a model for sorting by the environmental quality of used cars.
Introduction
Automobile emissions are partly responsible for air pollution and global warming. If car owners care about the emissions of their cars, we expect the used-car market to react to the arrival of new information about the emissions of cars. One possible reaction is sorting based on preferences for environmental quality (see, e.g., Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999 , for a comprehensive discussion of sorting in markets for durable goods under heterogeneous preferences). Car owners with high preferences for environmental quality could sell their cars to individuals with low preferences for environmental quality.
In this study, we exploit the decline in the observed environmental quality of Volkswagen (VW) diesel cars after the disclosure of the stunning VW emissions scandal to investigate reactions to information disclosure. On September 18, 2015, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disclosed the installation of defeat device software in the emission control systems of VW diesel engines (EPA, 2015) . This disclosure reduced the observable environmental quality of VW diesel cars because the defeat device negatively affects the environmental and engine performance of the manipulated cars. Furthermore, the durability of several parts of the exhaust system (e.g., the catalytic converter) could significantly decline after retrofitting, thus increasing maintenance costs. Since market participants did not expect the information revealed by this disclosure, the resulting decline in observable environmental quality is a quasi-experimental exogenous shock to the used-car market.
Several studies show that car buyers' willingness to pay is sensitive to fuel prices (e.g., Allcott and Wosny, 2013; Busse et al., 2013; Sallee et al., 2016) . These studies argue that car buyers take the future fuel costs of vehicles with different fuel economies into account. In contrast to these studies, we investigate the reactions of potential car sellers to information disclosure about the environmental quality of cars, which is related to fuel economy. Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015) investigate the random disclosure of information (for potential bidders) about the quality of used cars during online auctions. The unexpected disclosure of new information increases sales probability and revenue for sellers. Surprisingly, the results 2 remain the same regardless of whether the disclosed information increases or decreases the observable quality. They argue that the (re-) sorting of bidders with heterogeneous quality preferences increases competition, even if the new information reveals low quality. In contrast to Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015) , we investigate a sorting mechanism on the supply side and focus on aspects related to environmental quality. Peterson and Schneider (2014) investigate the defect probability of different car components and the corresponding turnover rates for different car models. Components with a high probability of an easily detectable defect increase the turnover rates of cars. This is evidence for sorting on the supply side with respect to observable car quality. However, it is difficult to test the causal effect of information disclosure on the supply of used cars because we are usually unable to observe exogenous variation in observable used-car quality. Furthermore, Peterson and Schneider (2014) do not consider car components that affect the environmental quality of cars.
We base our analyses on data collected from a large German online car advertisement portal. The volume of this online market is approximately 3.6 million cars per year, which reflects a trade value of 40 billion euros per year or 50% of the German used-car market. Furthermore, we observe detailed car and seller characteristics. We employ difference-indifferences estimators to investigate asking prices and market shares of diesel cars by carmakers and time periods before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. In particular, we use unconditional and conditional differences-in-differences estimators. In the latter approach, we account for important variables that could affect the structure of the used-car market.
For this purpose, we use semi-parametric radius matching estimators with bias adjustment (Lechner et al., 2011) .
We find that the supply of used VW diesel cars increases significantly after the disclosure of the emission manipulation scandal. The positive supply effects increase with the probability of manipulation. Furthermore, we find evidence of negative effects on asking prices for cars with a high probability of manipulation. We rationalize these findings using Peterson and Schneiders (2016) model of sorting in durable goods markets.
We provide evidence that spillover effects to non-manipulated VW diesel cars do not explain an increase in the supply or decline in the asking price of used cars. This mitigates the plausibility of several alternative explanations for our findings, for example, that the overall reliability of diesel cars decreases after the disclosure of the scandal or that mainly risk averse car owners bring their used cars to market.
Furthermore, we provide evidence that these results are strongly driven by the supply of minivans and sport utility vehicles (SUVs). Both vehicle classes are heavy polluters. Compact cars drive the negative asking price effects. Finally, we show that it is mainly professional car dealers who do not offer a warranty that increase their supply of VW diesel vehicles after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal.
In the next section, we introduce the background of the VW emission scandal. In Section 3, we introduce a small sorting model. In Section 4, we describe the data. In Section 5, we describe our empirical strategy. In Section 6, we report the empirical results. In Section 7, we discuss alternative explanations for our findings. The final section concludes the paper. We provide additional material in Online Appendices A-E.
The VW emission scandal
Many countries use emission standards to limit toxic and greenhouse gases in automobile exhaust. In the last two decades, the European Union and the US significantly reduced the nitrogen oxide (NOx) limits for automobile exhaust (see Online Appendix A for details).
Car manufacturers had to improve the emission control technology in their cars. In 2007, the US authorities certified the VW diesel engine EA 189 under the strictest nitrogen oxide limits at the time. The engine achieved low nitrogen emissions with a nitrogen oxide storage catalytic converter (see, e.g., Yang et al., 2015, for details) . This converter stores nitrogen 4 oxide in a catalyst material (often barium) and converts it into nitrogen (N2) and carbon dioxide (CO2). The conversion process requires the injection of additional fuel to regenerate the catalytic converter, which increases fuel consumption. The converter has a low durability, especially when the injected fuel includes high amounts of sulfur.
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However, the EA 189 engine has a defeat device for the emission control system. The defeat device software recognizes when a car is on the test stand. In test stand mode, the emission control system operates optimally. However, the capacity of the emission system is reduced or completely switched off when the car is not on the test stand (see, e.g., Thompson et al., 2014) . VW sold 11 million cars worldwide with defeat devices (2.4 million cars in Germany).
Before the EPA disclosed the installation of the defeat device software, only a small number of managers and EPA officers were aware of the emission test manipulations (Clemente and Gabbioneta, 2017) . The nitrogen oxide emissions of cars with a defeat device exceed official limits by up to 40 times (New York Times, 2015) . Within days of the disclosure, VW shares lost more than 20% of their value (approximately 15 billion euros), and the CEO of VW (Martin Winterkorn) resigned (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2017) . Since October 2, 2015, VW customers have been able to check an online portal to see if their car has a defeat device.
On October 30, 2015, VW submitted retrofitting plans for cars in Germany, but considerable uncertainty remains. Although retrofitting is mandatory in Germany, many cars still have the defeat device. It appears that some cars only require a software update, while other cars need a serious engine retrofit.
On April 23, 2016, Der Spiegel headlines revealed that Bosch AG (a German automotive supplier) delivered the defeat devices not only to VW but also to many other car producers worldwide (Spiegel, 2016) .
3 On October 25, 2016, US courts and VW agreed on a compensation payment of 15 billion US dollars to US customers (approximately 480,000 cars with defeat devices were sold in the US; see, e.g. Stanwick and Stanwick, 2017) . This includes the costs of retrofitting, buybacks, and individual compensation of between 5,000 and 10,000 US could directly affect the environmental performance, power, and/or fuel consumption of the vehicle. Owners of manipulated cars must visit the garage for retrofitting, which is time consuming. Moreover, the durability of the exhaust gas recirculation valve, the particulate filter, and the catalytic converter could significantly decline after retrofitting. It appears that VW car owners have to bear at least some of the (direct or indirect) costs.
The image of VW diesel cars declined after the disclosure of the emission manipulation scandal (Clemente and Gabbioneta, 2017; Stanwick and Stanwick, 2017) . Furthermore, the emission scandal could have had spillover effects on VW gasoline cars, as well as diesel cars from other producers (Clemente and Gabbioneta, 2017) . For example, the image of diesel cars could have declined, and individuals could have updated their expectations about future car quality fraud revelations. We assume that the decline in observable quality is stronger for VW diesel than for other carmakers, such that the relative loss in observable quality is negative for VW diesel cars. 
Sorting
We use a simplified version of Peterson and Schneider's (2016) model for sorting in durable goods markets to obtain a rationale for the potential effects of the VW emission scandal on the used car market (see also Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999, 2002) . The parameters of the model are as follows: Potential used-car sellers own one used car each. Potential used-car buyers are not endowed with any car. A potential used-car seller has the taste for quality θ that is drawn from the uniform distribution [1, θ H ]. The cumulative distribution of potential used-car sellers with taste for quality θ is H(θ) = (θ − 1)/(θ H − 1). All potential used-car buyers have the taste for quality θ = 1. The taste for the quality of potential buyers is lower than that of potential sellers, which reflects their willingness to buy cars that have been discarded by the potential car sellers. We assume that the number of potential used-car buyers exceeds the number of potential used-car sellers.
Let Q > 0 be the quality of a used car (including environmental quality), which is observable for potential sellers and buyers. The utility of owning a car for a driver with taste θ is θQ. Drivers gain zero utility from owning a second car. Potential sellers have the option to replace their used car with a new car. The quality of a new car is Q N with Q N > Q.
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The price of a new car is P N . We assume that the new car market is competitive, such that Q N and P N are exogenous and not influenced by the used-car market. 4 Furthermore, we assume that θ H Q N > P N > Q N , which implies that it is efficient for some potential sellers to replace their used car with a new one. Because we assume that the number of potential used-car buyers exceeds the number of potential used-car sellers, the market price of used cars equals the potential buyers' reservation prices, which are proportional to the observed car qualities. The used-car market price is P (Q) = Q because θ = 1 for potential buyers of used cars. Accordingly, the marginal effects of observed quality on used-car prices are positive (∂P (Q)/∂Q = 1). This suggests that a lower observable environmental quality would have a negative impact on the prices of used cars.
Potential sellers have an incentive to sell their used car and buy a new car when the utility from driving the new car, θQ N , minus the price differential between the prices of the new and the used cars, (P N − P (Q)), exceeds the utility from driving the used car, θQ. The utility of
. The marginal effect of the observed quality on the utility of trade is negative,
This suggests that a decline in observed environmental quality would increase the utility of trade. This would imply that an owner of a VW diesel vehicle generates more utility from trade after the emission scandal. Potential sellers offer their car on the used car market when the utility of trade is positive. This suggests that a decline in the observable environmental quality increases the probability of supplying used cars.
We collect our data from a large German online car advertisement platform. Private car owners and firms offer their cars for sale on this platform. They usually post several pictures and detailed descriptions of the offered car together with an asking price. Potential buyers can search for cars on this platform. When they find an appropriate car, they contact the seller directly. The seller and potential buyer may arrange a meeting, which gives the potential buyer the possibility to inspect the car. They then negotiate mutually over the transaction price, which can deviate from the asking price.
5 If the seller and buyer agree on the terms of the trade, then they legally transfer ownership of the car.
Selection of the estimation sample
Our sample covers the daily inflow of used cars from August 26, 2015, to April 15, 2016. The sample period ends one week before Der Spiegel headlines revealed that Bosch AG delivered defeat devices to many car producers worldwide (Spiegel, 2016) . We analyze only used cars with diesel or gasoline engines. We omit cars with a mileage above 200,000 km or that are older than 20 years. German cities have environmental zones. Cars are only allowed to enter these zones when they have a special tag on the windshield that indicates low particulate matter emissions.
The lowest particulate matter emissions is indicated by a green tag. Over 80% of the offered cars have such a green particulate matter tag. obtain an average discount of 10% from the list price. Furthermore, they find considerable heterogeneity in the discount rate with respect to buyer and car characteristics. Figure 4 shows the weekly average first asking prices of diesel cars by car make. The asking price is much higher for German than non-German car makes. We observe a price dip during the Christmas week. Other than that, the average first asking prices are remarkably stable over time. Figure 5 shows a similar pattern for gasoline cars.
Figures 4 and 5 around here
We calculate the duration between the first and last day online. We observe that more than 95% of the car advertisements are no longer online after a period of 4 months. However, we observe cars for at most 24 days before the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The online duration is contaminated when the car advertisement was uploaded before the disclosure of the VW emission scandal and deleted afterwards. To account for this, we calculate KaplanMeier survival rates for the first 24 days online. Figures 6-9 show that the online duration is slightly longer after than before the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. This difference is somewhat more pronounced for VW than non-VW cars.
Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 around here
Empirical approach
We compare the share and asking prices of diesel cars before and after the disclosure of the emission scandal and between VW and the other carmakers. 6 We consider the share and not the quantity of diesel cars because general market conditions affect the share less (e.g., the used car market shows strong seasonality). The dummy variable D, d ∈ 0, 1, defines diesel (D = 1) and gasoline cars (D = 0). The variable Y is the first asking price (in euros). We distinguish eight time periods in our analyses, T , t ∈ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. The first time period t = 0 is just before the VW emission scandal was disclosed. The other periods indicate the first seven months after the disclosure. Furthermore, we distinguished between two groups, G, g ∈ 0, 1. The first group includes VW cars (g = 1), and the second group includes cars from other carmakers (g = 0). The share of diesel vehicles by group and time is indicated by
We estimate the effect of the disclosure of the VW emission sandal on the share of VW diesel cars by
for s ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. We estimate the effects on the first asking price of VW diesel cars by
We assume that the decline in observable quality is stronger for VW diesel cars than for cars from other carmakers. However, δ s and α s are conservative estimates because other carmakers could also be affected by the disclosure of the emission scandal. If the VW diesel scandal affects the share of both groups in the same direction, then we underestimate the true effect. Therefore, δ s and α s could be lower bounds of the impacts of the emission scandal on the share and asking price of VW diesel cars. Alternatively, if some individuals have a particular preference for diesel cars, the emissions scandal might reduce the attractiveness of VW diesels cars but increase demand for non-VW diesel cars. This increase in demand could affect the supply and price of used cars and lead to a positive bias. In Section 6.3, we provide some evidence against this alternative hypothesis of a positive bias by using an alternative control group.
It could be that observable car characteristics change between the groups over time. For example, sellers could bring older cars to market. Because diesel cars tend to have a longer lifecycle than gasoline cars, this type of market behavior would increase the share of diesel cars.
To account for this, we define the conditional share of diesel cars
where X contains observable car and seller characteristics (see Table B .1 in Online Appendix B for a list of all control variables we consider). We estimate the effect of the disclosure of the emission scandal on the share of VW cars with diesel engines conditional on observable 13 characteristics.
The parameters γ s (x) and µ s (x) measure the effects of the emission scandal's disclosure on the share and asking price of VW cars with diesel engines for cars and sellers with similar observable characteristics. We integrate the conditional effects to
which are the average effects defined for cars and sellers with characteristics that are similar to the VW group in the pre-disclosure period. Intuitively, this is the direct effect of the VW emission scandal after controlling for other possible market distortions. If we find an effect of the emission scandal on the share or asking price of diesel cars, even after controlling for a large set of important observable characteristics, then this is a strong indication of sorting.
We perform estimations in separate samples for each group and each period. We estimate the conditional moments with radius matching on the propensity score (see Lechner et al., 2011) . 7 The propensity scores are parametrically specified by Probit models, and the conditional expectations of the outcomes are unrestricted and thus non-parametric. The algorithm is more precise than nearest-neighbor matching due to the idea of radius matching (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) . Furthermore, the procedure uses the initial matching weights for a (weighted) regression adjustment for bias reduction in a second step (see Abadie and Imbens, 2011) . 8 This regression adjustment should also reduce small sample and asymptotic biases of 7 The (main) advantage of matching as opposed to (widely used) linear regression-based difference-indifferences approaches is the robustness to misspecification of the linear model. 8 Therefore, the estimator satisfies the so-called double robustness property, implying that it is consistent 14 matching. Huber et al. (2013) investigate the finite sample properties of this algorithm along with other matching type estimators and find it to be very competitive.
We set the radius size to 90% of the 0.9th quantile of the distance between matched treated and control observations occurring in standard nearest-neighbor matching. Inference is based on bootstrapping the respective effect 499 times and using the standard deviation of the bootstrapped effects as an estimate of the standard error of the t-statistic. Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrap-based standard errors may be invalid for matching based on a fixed number of comparison observations. However, our matching algorithm is smoother than the latter approach because it (by the nature of radius matching) uses a variable number of comparisons that are distance-weighted within the radius and, moreover, applies the regression adjustment. Therefore, the bootstrap is likely to be a valid inference procedure for the radius matching estimator used here. It performs well in a large-scale (empirically based) simulation study by Bodory et al. (2016) , who investigate the performance of several variance estimators in the context of propensity score-based matching estimation. Figure 10 documents the unconditional estimates of supply. They reflect the difference in the share of vehicles with diesel engines between VW and other carmakers. During the first two months after the disclosure, we find a one-percentage-point lower share of VW diesel cars;
Results

Unconditional estimates
between months three and five, we find a one-percentage-point higher share of VW diesel cars.
In months six and seven, the difference in the shares does not differ significantly from zero. Figure 10 around here if either the propensity score or the regression model is correctly specified (e.g., Rubin, 1979; Joffe et al., 2004) .
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The results could reflect delay and catch-up effects. This time pattern could be due to an initial shock of the scandal reducing the supply (possibly a response to a decrease in demand).
Once the news wears off and demand returns to levels similar to previous ones, all the cars that were not supplied immediately after the scandal join the cars that would have been supplied in any case, leading to an increase in supply. Then, once the 'delayed supply' is sold off, supply returns to normal levels. However, sellers can advertise their cars even when there is little demand. Furthermore, the VW scandal was not settled within six months, and it persists to the present.
An alternative explanation for this pattern is that car owners retrofitted their manipulated cars before selling them. However, this explanation is unlikely because the retrofitting plans
were submitted approximately 1.5 months after the revelation of the emission scandal for approval to the German Federal Motor Transport Authority. It followed a long-lasting political debate about the optimal retrofitting plan. To date, many manipulated cars have not received retrofitting in Germany. Figure 11 shows the estimates for first asking prices. The differences are mostly insignificant, but we find positive asking price differences four and five months after the disclosure of the scandal. The change in the asking prices of VW diesel cars is up to 500 euros higher than the change in non-VW diesel cars. It is possible that VW diesel cars with better quality (e.g., lower mileage) came to the market after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. This could lead to an upward bias of the asking price estimates if we do not control for important car characteristics. We discuss the conditional effects in the next section. Figure 12 presents the results of the conditional difference-in-differences approach. We control for different dummies for car age and mileage. Following the specification in Lacetera et al.
Conditional estimates
(2012), we control for the first seven polynomials of mileage. We include dummies for vehicle class and car body. Additionally, we include dummies for full service history, warranty, the validity of general inspection, and private seller. We control for different emission standards and fuel consumption of the offered car. Tables B.1-B.4 in Online Appendix B present the balance of all control variables that we consider before matching by group and time period.
We find large imbalances, especially between the two groups of VW cars (diesel and gasoline engines) and other carmakers. The cars from other makers are, on average, older than VW cars. Additionally, the share of Euro 6 cars and the age of cars within the groups increases over time. This could explain the delay and catch-up effects because, for example, used diesel vehicles are on average older than gasoline vehicles. Furthermore, this could explain the positive asking price estimates for VW diesel vehicles. When performing matching, one should check for potential issues of (i) insufficient support in the propensity scores across treatment states that may result in incomparable matches as well as large matching weights of some non-treated observations with specific propensity scores and (ii) imbalances in covariates after matching (due to inappropriate propensity score Appendix E. We find only small imbalances between groups and periods. The standardized differences are always below 10.
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The conditional results suggest no significant effects on the share of VW diesel vehicles during the first two months after the disclosure of the emission scandal. Subsequently, we find significant positive effects on the share of VW diesel vehicles between months 3 and 7. In months 4 and 5, the share of VW diesel vehicles increases by 4 percentage points. In months 6 and 7, the effects on the VW diesel share decline but are still positive and significant. Accordingly, the results are robust and even more positive after we control for a large set of relevant covariates. The positive effects clearly dominate the insignificant effects during the first two months. The findings cannot merely reflect delay and catch-up effects. Cars with emission standards below or above Euro 5 have no defeat device. We consider the results for those groups as a placebo sensitivity check. For VW diesel cars with an emission standard less stringent than Euro 5, we do not find any effects. For VW diesel cars regulated under the Euro 6 emission standard, we find negative effects six months after the disclosure.
Accordingly, the results for cars without a defeat device are either insignificant or move in the opposite direction. This is evidence in favor of the placebo sensitivity check. In contrast, the share of VW diesel cars regulated under the Euro 5 emission standard significantly increased after the emission scandal, which is consistent with the predictions of the small sorting model. In sum, for cars with a high probability of a defeat device, we find positive supply and negative asking price effects. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the sorting model above. The spillover effects to not-manipulated VW diesel are inconsistent with the predictions of the sorting model.
Alternative control group
It is challenging to find a suitable control group for difference-in-difference estimators. On the one hand, the control and treatment groups should be similar, such that the two groups have comparable market trends. On the other hand, overly similar control and treatment groups could lead to spillover effects.
Figures 14 and 15 report the findings of a sensitivity test using only non-German car makes in the control group. Arguably, non-German car makes are less affected by the disclosure of the VW emission scandal than German car makes, but they might follow different market trends. Qualitatively, the results are similar regardless of whether we include German cars in the control group. However, quantitatively, the effects are slightly larger when we exclude German car makes, which is supporting evidence of a negative bias. Furthermore, we find significant negative asking price estimates in the fourth month after the disclosure. The findings of this sensitivity check suggest that the magnitudes of the main results are a lower bound.
Figures 14 and 15 around here 6.4 Effect heterogeneity Table 6 shows the effect of the VW emission scandal on the share of diesel cars by vehicle class.
The positive effects are mainly driven by minivans and SUVs. These cars are considered heavy polluters because of their size and weight. Accordingly, the empirical results are coherent for those vehicle classes that are most affected by the disclosure of the VW emission scandal.
Moreover, we also find significant positive effects on the share of diesel cars for compact and medium-sized cars. Small cars are the only class for which we do not find a significant increase in the share of diesel cars. If anything, we observe a negative delayed effect in the first month after the disclosure of the emission manipulation scandal. Table 7 reports that compact cars (VW Golf) are mainly responsible for the negative first asking price differences. Tables 6 and 7 around here   Table 8 reports effect heterogeneity by seller type. The share of VW diesel cars does not increase among private sellers. In contrast, the share of VW diesel cars actually declines among private sellers. For professional car dealers, we observe a significant increase in the share of VW diesel cars. Only in the first month after the disclosure did we find a negative delayed effect. It is possible that VW diesel car owners more often engage professional car dealers as sales agents, or leasing contracts are terminated instead of extended (i.e., exploiting buyback options). The latter could occur because car lessors believe that the buyback price specified in the leasing contract is higher than the market price after the disclosure. Furthermore, car 20 owners can trade-in their used car when they buy a new car. New car buyers often have a higher preference for quality than used car buyers. Accordingly, this explanation would be consistent with the assumption that car owners with high quality preferences in particular supply their cars. Table 8 around here
Some professional car dealers provide warranties on offered used cars. The lower part of Table 8 shows the effect heterogeneity between professional car dealers with and without an offered warranty. For both groups, we find evidence of an increase in the share of VW diesel vehicles. However, for professional car dealers without a warranty, the positive effect is much more persistent across the sample period, whereas we only find significant positive effects in the fifth month after disclosure for professional car dealers with a warranty. Accordingly, professional car dealers who do not offer warranties are mainly responsible for the increase in the share of VW diesel cars after the emission scandal. It appears that dealers who offer warranties are less willing to offer these warranties on vehicles that are known to have defects in the exhaust system. Table 9 reports effect heterogeneity in first asking prices by seller type. However, the results are ambiguous, and no clear pattern can be detected. If anything, it appears that professional sellers are more willing to offer a price discount than private sellers. Although the positive supply and negative asking price effects are consistent with the predictions of the small sorting model introduced in Section 3, alternative mechanisms could explain similar empirical patterns. First, the quality of all diesel cars could decline after the diesel scandal because all diesel cars lose reputation. This is certainly the case, but we believe that the quality loss is stronger for VW diesel cars than for other diesel and gasoline cars. The share of non-manipulated VW diesel cars is not altered by the scandal (see Table 4 ), which is evidence against strong spillover effects. Nevertheless, our results may provide a lower bound for the effect of the VW emission scandal on the supply of used cars. The results of Section 6.3 provide suggestive evidence that spillover effects would bias our results towards zero.
Second, information about the VW scandal could be available to the car owner but may (partially) diffuse among potential buyers over time. This could incentivize owners of manipulated cars to sell early to skim naive buyers. However, the VW diesel scandal received so much media attention that any potential buyer should have been immediately aware of it. It is more likely that car owners of non-manipulated cars attempted to sell before the possible revelation of further manipulations. However, we do not find such a pattern in the data (see Table 4 ).
Third, risk aversion could be an alternative motive to sorting for supplying manipulated cars. Owners who are risk averse might not want to take a risk in holding on to their manipulated car, and less risk-averse buyers might be glad to accept the risk. Possibly, they do not trust the retrofitting plans or fear future fraud revelations. In the latter case, we would expect to find supply effects for all VW diesel cars and not only for those with a high probability of manipulation. We cannot find evidence for this in the data (see Table 4 ).
Conclusions
We exploit the quasi-experimental decline in the observable environmental quality of VW diesel vehicles after the disclosure of the VW emission manipulation scandal by using a conditional difference-in-differences method based on semi-parametric matching estimators to analyze German car supply around the scandal. We document supply-side reactions to the environmental quality of cars. The supply of VW cars with a high probability of having a defeat device increases after the disclosure of the VW emission manipulation scandal. Fur-22 thermore, we find some evidence of negative effects of the VW emission scandal on the asking prices of cars with a high manipulation probability.
We rationalize our findings with the predictions of a simple sorting model. Individuals with high preferences for environmental quality could sell their VW diesel cars to individuals with low preferences for environmental quality. This could increase the market volume even when prices are falling.
The main takeaway of this study is that information about the environmental quality of cars is important for the car market. This suggests that there is demand for better certification processes for the environmental quality of cars.
A disadvantage of our study is that we only observe advertisements for and not transactions of cars. Further research could investigate demand-side reactions to the disclosure of environmental quality information. Notes: This figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival rates of VW diesel vehicles before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. Survival rates report the share of vehicles remaining on the used car market for a certain duration.
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Figure 7: Kaplan-Meier survival curve of VW gasoline vehicles.
Notes: This figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival rates of VW gasoline vehicles before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. Survival rates report the share of vehicles remaining on the used car market for a certain duration. Notes: This figure plots the difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The first difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second difference is between VW and other car makes. The diamonds indicate the resulting differences in the share of used diesel vehicles. The capped vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly averages. The confidence intervals are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota cars. Notes: This figure plots the difference-in-differences in the first asking price of used diesel vehicles for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The first difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second difference is between VW and other car makes. The diamonds indicate the resulting differences in the first asking price of used diesel vehicles. The capped vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly averages. The confidence intervals are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars. Notes: This figure plots the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price of used diesel vehicles for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. Diesel cars are matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between VW and non-German car makes. The diamonds indicate the resulting matched differences in the first asking price of used diesel vehicles. The capped vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the monthly averages. The confidence intervals are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The non-German car makes include Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars. Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price (in euros) of used diesel vehicles for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by emission standard. Defeat devices were only disclosed for VW diesel vehicles regulated under the Euro 5 emission standard. Diesel cars are matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a nonparametric bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels. Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by vehicle class. Diesel and gasoline cars are matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels. 
Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price (in euros) of used diesel vehicles for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by vehicle class. Diesel cars are matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a nonparametric bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels. Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences of the used car diesel share for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by seller type. Diesel and gasoline cars are matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels. Notes: This table reports the matched difference-in-differences in the first asking price (in euros) of used diesel vehicles for the first seven months after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal by seller type. Diesel cars are matched at the individual car level such that they share the same characteristics. The first matched difference is between the time before and after the disclosure of the VW emission scandal. The second matched difference is between VW and other car makes. The other car makes include Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Ford, Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Toyota diesel cars. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated with a non-parametric bootstrap (499 replications). The asterisks indicate 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) significance levels.
